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Considerable controversy and debate surrounds the practice of slotting allowances, or fees,
paid by manufacturers for obtaining the patronage of retailers. To date, regulators have yet
to agree on public policy toward these practices: at least one federal antitrust agency
suggests that slotting fees may be competitive, another has conducted investigations into
these practices, and still another suggests banning them altogether. In this article, the
authors examine the recent decision by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(BATF) to prohibit slotting allowances in the retail sale of alcohol beverages. Focusing on
the regulatory environment, industry structure, marketing practices, and consumer
consumption behavior in the alcohol beverage industry, the authors analyze the BATF's
decision and attempt to reconcile disparate public policy treatment of these practices.
Implications for understanding slotting allowances and recommendations for further public
policy development and research then are explored.
Slotting allowances, or fees, are becoming increasinglycontroversial (Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997;Shaffer 1991), These payments to retailers for stock-
ing and displaying new products, or for other support ser-
vices, have drawn criticism from manufacturers, small
retailers, public policymakers, and scholars (Cannon and
Bloom 1991), Complaints have centered around the poten-
tial for these fees to be applied discriminatorily (because
they often are negotiated secretly), harmful to both small
manufacturers and small retailers, and generally, a symptom
of unfair abuse of retailer power. In contrast, those who
defend these fees regard them as simply a risk-transfer
mechanism and their use as a basis for signaling the quality
of new products so that retailers can be more efficient in
selecting and promoting merchandise (Kelly 1991).
Most recently, slotting allowances have come under the
scrutiny of the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), in its regulation of the retail
sale of alcohol beverages. Historically, slotting fees have
been discouraged by the BATF on the basis that such prac-
tices might be competitively exclusionary and threaten
retailer independence, which are important considerations
under the Federal Alcohol Administration (FAA) Act
(1935), However, prompted by previous court decisions
regarding the BATF's interpretation of how certain promo-
tional approaches should be treated under the Act, the BATF
adopted regulations in 1995 that ban slotting allowance
practices in the retail sale of alcohol beverages (60 Federal
Register 20402),
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The BATF's prohibition represents a significant depar-
ture from standing public policy toward slotting allowances
as administered by the other federal agencies responsible for
overseeing competitive practices. Although it reportedly has
investigated slotting allowances as far back as 1990 and
suggested their discriminatory application may be unlawful
(Federal Trade Commission Guides 1990), to date, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) has not challenged such prac-
tices as anticompetitive. Activity in the Justice Department
(JD), until recently, has been similarly skeptical of the
potential anticompetitive nature of these practices (McCabe
1996), In a recent investigation, however, the JD reportedly
examined the prospect that the payment of slotting fees by
large competitors might have disadvantaged smaller rivals
in the salty-snack industry (Greenwald 1996),
In this article, we examine slotting allowance practices in
the retail sale of alcohol beverages. As background, we first
overview the nature, controversy, and public policy sur-
rounding slotting allowances. We then focus on public pol-
icy treatment of these practices in the retail sale of alcohol
beverages and their recent prohibition by the BATF, Com-
paratively examining the regulatory environment, industry
structure, marketing practices, and consumer consumption
behavior found in the alcohol beverage industry versus other
grocery products, we analyze the BATF's decision. This
analysis reveals key differences in the retail sale of alcohol
beverages and provides a basis for more clearly understand-
ing the BATF's contrary policy toward these practices.
From this analysis, we then derive implications for under-
standing slotting practices in general and recommendations
for the development of further public policy and academic
research.
Background
Slotting allowances have been defined broadly as "fees paid
by manufacturers to obtain retailer patronage" (Shaffer
1991, p, 120), As we illustrate in Table 1, these can include
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Fees for making new product presentation appointment.
Fees for the privilege of making new product sales presentations.
Fees for responding to questionnaires aimed at gauging demand for a new product.
Fees for price cuts made on existing products to make room for a new product.
Fees or free cases of product, or both, to stock a new product.
Fees to keep a new product on store shelves or maintain slow-moving products or all products in general.
Fees for removal of products that do not meet expected sales goals.
a range of fees for virtually every stage of a product's pres-
ence in retail stores. For example, beyond fees or other
remuneration for stocking a product, fees for appointments
(e.g., appointment and presentation fees), removing old
products, or cutting prices on slow-moving products have
been reported (Donahue 1989; Kiley 1989; Progressive
Grocer 1991). Slotting fees are said to provide compensa-
tion for the basic overhead associated with products, per-
sonnel hours, computer time, and other costs of making
arrangements for new items (Cannon and Bloom 1991;
Partch, Duff, and Litwak 1990).
Mechanisms through which such fees most commonly are
paid include cash payments; free goods; and introductory,
sampling, off-invoice, or spoilage allowances {Progressive
Grocer 1991). Usually, slotting fees are negotiated orally
and in private; therefore, little public data are available as to
their nature and effect. An industry report estimates the
magnitude of these fees nationwide as averaging, across all
categories on a per-store basis, approximately $42 per stock-
keeping unit {Progressive Grocer 1996). Aggregately, how-
ever, companies have reported paying between $300,000
and $1.5 million per new product and from one-third (Smith
1990) to almost one-half (Therrien 1989) their promotion
budgets to cover these fees (cf. Sales and Marketing Man-
agement 1989). Nevertheless, it is not clear that all manu-
facturers are paying slotting fees (Freeman and Dagnoli
1988; Gibson 1988; but see Sales and Marketing Manage-
ment 1989) on all products (Hammonds and Radtke 1990).
Also, it is not clear how far slotting allowances have spread
beyond the grocery industry, such as into the book, soft-
ware, and pharmaceutical industries.
Controversy and Debate
Advocates of slotting allowances suggest they are justified
because of the efficiencies they yield and the role such fees
play in the overall distribution system. These supporters
contend slotting fees provide a form of "insurance"
{Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report 1994; Kiley 1990b),
or "performance bond" (Kelly 1991), in the event new prod-
ucts do not sell and, therefore, compensate retailers for "fail-
ure risks" and "opportunity costs" associated with new
products. In addition, advocates suggest these fees provide a
valuable source of information about the likely success of a
new product. Slotting fees, they argue, can serve as a "mar-
ket signal" that enables manufacturers to distinguish their
product innovations efficiently and credibly communicate
their beliefs and intentions regarding such products (Kelly
1991).
Those who oppose slotting allowances argue that retailer
justifications for these practices do not always exist, or
where they do, it is not clear whether the manufacturer or
retail seller is in the best position or should be responsible
for bearing the costs (Dagnoli and Freeman 1988). More-
over, when manufacturers and product suppliers agree to
pay slotting fees, the fees imposed reportedly bear little rela-
tion or are intractable to the true costs retailers claim (Gib-
son 1988). Manufacturers and suppliers contend that retail-
ers, realizing the profit potential of these fees and their new-
found market power, often engage in these practices simply
to increase profits rather than to offset real costs, thereby
creating widespread discrimination and abuse (Johnson
1988). In addition, such practices allegedly are employed
competitively by aggressive rivals as a basis for foreclosing
smaller competitors through bidding up these fees (cf.
Greenwald 1996). Concern for innovation (Gorman 1988)
and the welfare of small manufacturers, wholesalers, retail-
ers (Kiley 1990a), and consumers (Therrien 1989) also has
been expressed (cf. Charlier 1994; Jones 1991; Radtke
1990).
Public Policy
Public policy activity by federal antitrust authorities has yet
to yield a conclusive position on the competitive implica-
tions of slotting allowance practices.' In the early 1990s, the
FTC was reported to be investigating such practices (Free-
man and Dagnoli 1988; Gibson 1988; but see Progressive
'Similarly, the courts have not developed a cogent posture toward slot-
ting allowance practices. Court cases and formal complaints by private par-
ties specifically involving slotting allowance practices have nol been wide-
spread. A legal database (LEXIS, August 24, 1996) search of both federal
and state cases containing the terms "slotting fee" and "slotting allowance"
and their derivatives resulted in identification of only eight cases. Only
seven of these cases substantively addressed slotting allowance practices.
The issues litigated in these cases range from disagreements regarding
promises to pay such fees (Dunkirk tee Cream Co. v. Mid-Atlanlic Ice
Cream Co. 1996; E.J. Brock Corp. v. Filbert Inl'l. Inc. 1991; Scotts ofWi.i-
consin V. R.P.S. Distributors 1993) to the discriminatory use of slotting fees
(Hygrade Milk & Cream Co. v. Tropicana Produce 1996; Land O'Lakes.
Inc. V. Fredjo's Enterprises 1992) to the relevance of slotting fees in ana-
lyzing the competitive environment attendant to a merger case (Pennsylva-
nia V. Russell Stover Candies Inc. 1993) to a franchise dispute (Beloit Bev-
erage Co. V. Winterbrook Corp. 1995). In each case, slotting fees as a mar-
keting practice were not found to be violative of the antitrust laws. The lack
of widely accepted descriptors and the evolving nature of slotting
allowance practices may underlie the perceived contra.sl between the lim-
ited number of cases and formal complaints and the widely reported debate
surrounding slotting fees.
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Grocer 1990), but a disclosure of findings by the agency has
not been made public to date, though the agency has indi-
cated that the discriminatory application of slotting fees
may be unlawful {Federal Trade Commission Guides
1990).2 Indirectly, published statements by an FTC com-
missioner and one staff member (Kelly 1991) suggest that
such practices may enhance efficiency and, therefore, be
regarded as competitively justified, if not desirable, by the
FTC (cf. Freeman and Fahey 1990). As was stated by Com-
missioner Deborah K. Owen {Antitrust and Trade Regula-
tion Report 1994, p. 703; 60 Federal Register 20409), slot-
ting fees provide
a form of insurance for the retailer ... [that] reduce, and perhaps
eliminate [itsl risk—or at least transfer some of it to the pro-
ducer—by charging a fee that essentially provides indemnifica-
tion from the loss of profits that would arise if the new product
falls to sell well.
Somewhat in contrast and more recently, an investigation
of the salty-snack food industt7 by the JD reportedly
focuses on slotting allowance practices as a mechanism of
competitive foreclosure (Greenwald 1996). Investigators are
attempting to assess whether firms are purchasing more
shelf space than they need through slotting fees and other
practices in an effort to foreclose less resourceful rivals
anticompetitively. Antitrust observers point out, however,
that the JD investigation stands in contrast to extant policy,
given that the federal agency has not challenged shelf space
practices in more than a decade (Greenwald 1996).
Slotting Allowance Practices and the
Retail Sale of Alcohol Beverages
Although slotting allowance practices may be observed with
increasing frequency in the retail sale of grocery products
and other retail categories (Shaffer 1991), their practice in
the retail sale of alcohol beverages generally has not been
permitted under the FAA Act (1935), as administered by the
BATF. The historical context of this Act as it relates to alco-
hol consumption provides the basis of this prohibition.
Recently, prompted by a Court of Appeals decision and as a
result of an agency review and petition by members of the
2The FTC's revised "Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Mer-
chandising Payments and Services" provides that "fT|he discriminatory
purchase of display or shelf space, whether directly or by means of .so-
called allowances, may violate the Act and may be considered an unfair
method of competition in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act" (n. 40). The explanation thai accompanies this footnote
explains the FTC's view (MacAvoy 1997). According to the FTC, a dis-
tinction is drawn between payments that are made "for admittance to a
store" and those that are made on an ongoing basis "for preferential posi-
tion with the store" (N. 40). Payments of the first type "concern the origi-
nal sale from seller to customer, and do not differ in sub.stance from a price
cut, the paradigm application of section 2(a)" (N. 40) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. In conlrasl. purchases that involve ongoing payments for prefer-
ential shelf or display position fall "more readily" within Section 2(d),
because they have a nexus to the product's subsequent resale. Section 2(d)
is a per se provision requiring only a demonstration of di.scrimination for a
violation to be found. The explanation therefore suggests that discrimina-
tory application of slotting allowances may be considered by the FTC a per
se violation of Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. See also Aalberts
and Judd (1991).
industry, the BATF proposed to amend trade practice regu-
lations under the FAA Act to prohibit slotting allowance fees
and their practice in the retail sale of alcohol beverages. In
this section, we review specific aspects of the FAA Act that
relate to slotting allowances and then describe the BATF's
regulatory proposal and adopted regulations.^
Federal Alcohol Administration Act
The FAA Act provides for federal regulation of the alcohol
beverage industry. The Act contains specific restrictions
that are unique to this industry and refiects Congress's con-
cern with a variety of trade practices and abuses that origi-
nated before, during, and immediately after Prohibition.
These restrictions detail particular activities in the sale of
alcohol beverages to a retailer by a producer (e.g., distiller,
brewer, rectifier, blender), importer, wholesaler, or bottler
as unfair competition or otherwise unlawful practices. In
Table 2, we describe these practices and their characteris-
tics. To result in a violation of the FAA Act, a necessary ele-
ment for each of the restricted practices is the "exclusion, in
whole or in part, of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages,
sold or offered for sale by other persons" (27 USCA 205
[a-d]). Although "exclusion" is not defined under the Act or
its regulations, historically the BATF has held that "exclu-
sion in part" includes "causing retailers to purchase less of a
competing brand than they otherwise would have bought"
(59 Federal Register 21698-01, p. 1). In a recent court rul-
ing involving a New Jersey distilled spirits wholesaler. Fed-
way Associates, this interpretation was challenged success-
fully and required to be modified.
Fedway Associates Inc. v. BATF (1992)
In 1986, Fedway initiated a moderately successful, short-
term promotion to increase the sales of vodka and rum to
retail establishments. Fedway offered retailers consumer
electronic goods, including televisions and videocassette
recorders, if they agreed to buy certain quantities of speci-
fied liquor. The promotional campaign lasted three months
and successfully boosted Fedway's sales. In 1989, the
BATF charged Fedway with a violation of the FAA Act, cit-
ing its promotional arrangement as exclusionary to rival
wholesalers. The BATF endeavored to suspend Fedway's
permits for the sale of alcohol beverages because of the pro-
motion. Fedway appealed the initial decision against its
practices to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that the promotional program
did not result in the exclusion of rival wholesalers. Inter-
preting congressional intent in the promulgation of the FAA
Act, the court observed that Congress had intended "exclu-
sion" to mean something more than just a retailer purchas-
ing less of a competing brand than it otherwise would have.
Merely taking some action that infiuenced a retailer not to
purchase a rival product, in the court's view, was not exclu-
sion under the Act if the retailer's response was the result of
a free economic choice. For a violation of the Act to occur.
3|t is important to point out that our analysis does not focus on state reg-
ulations pertaining to the retail sale of alcohol beverages becau.se of their
varying requirements and our focus on federal law.
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Table 2. Federal Alcohol Administration Act: Unfair Competition and Unlawful Practices Relating to Slotting Allowances"
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business as a distiller, brewer, rectifier, blender, or other producer, or as an importer or
wholesaler, of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, or as a bottler, or warehouseman and bottler, of distilled spirits, directly or indirectly
or through an affiliate:
(a) Exclusive outlet. To require any retailer to purchase any such products to the exclusion of alcohol beverages sold by other persons in
interstate or foreign commerce;
(b) "Tied house". To induce through any of the following means, any retailer, to purchase alcohol products to the exclusion of alcohol
beverages sold by other persons: (1) by acquiring or holding any interest in any license with respect to the premises of the retailer; or
(2) by acquiring any interest in real or personal property owned, occupied, or used by the retailer in the conduct of his business; or (3)
by furnishing, giving, renting, lending, or selling to the retailer, any equipment, fixtures, signs, supplies, money, services, or other
thing of value; or (4) by paying or crediting the retailer for any advertising, display, or distribution service; or (5) by guaranteeing any
loan or the repayment of any financial obligation of the retailer; or (6) by extending to the retailer credit for a period in excess of the
credit period usual and customary to the industry; or (7) by requiring the retailer to take and dispose of a certain quota of any of such
products;
(c) Commercial bribery. To induce through any of the following means, any trade buyer, to purchase alcohol products to the exclusion
of alcohol beverages sold by other persons: (I) by commercial bribery; or (2) by offering or giving any bonus, premium, or
compensation to any officer, or employee, or representative of the trade buyer;
(d) Consignment sales. To sell to any trade buyer, or for any such trade buyer to purchase any alcohol beverage products on consignment
or under conditional sale or with the privilege of return or on any basis otherwise than a bona fide sale.
"Summarized from 267 USCA 205(a-d).
according to the court, there must also be a tie or link
between the supplier (e.g., wholesaler) and retailer that
threatens the retailer's independence (e.g., freedom of
choice) and results in the exclusion of a rival.
The overriding concern expressed by the court was the
hindrance of legitimate competitive activities by the
enforcement actions of the BATF. The court ruled that, in
future enforcement activities, the BATF should take reason-
able account of both (1) policy interests underlying the trade
practice provisions of the FAA Act (i.e., that the alcohol
industry requires special oversight and regulation) and (2)
the value of procompetitive wholesale activities. This value
derives from not only the traditional benefits of competition,
in terms of lower prices and improved quality, but also a
competitive alcohol market helping deter the formation of a
corrupt black market. The court further held that, in arriving
at a reasonable interpretation of "exclusion," the BATF
must take care to distinguish rationally between those activ-
ities it decides are lawful and those that are not.
Proposed Amendments to Regulations of the FAA
Act
In response to and, in part, prompted by the court, the BATF
initiated a review and subsequent proposal (59 Federal Reg-
ister 21698) to amend and add to the regulations of exclu-
sion by following a framework consistent with the interpre-
tations in Fedway and a previous related case {Foremost
Sales Promotions Inc. v. BATF 1988). The courts in both
Fedway and Foremost held that "exclusion" as it is used in
the FAA Act cannot occur in the absence of a relationship or
arrangement between the industry member and the retailer
that directly or indirectly threatens the retailer's indepen-
dence. As proposed, the rulemaking procedures by the
BATF were intended to (1) promulgate a framework for
establishing "exclusion," (2) identify promotional practices
that result in the control of retailers (i.e., threaten retailer
independence), (3) identify practices that result in exclusion
under the Act, and (4) identify practices for which there was
no likelihood that exclusion would result and the BATF
would not take action.
Slotting Allowances
The proposed regulations sought to include slotting fees as
a promotional practice that threatened retailer independence
and provided the basis for exclusion, as defined in the FAA
Act. Under the proposed rules, slotting allowance arrange-
ments were described as "purchasing or renting specific
shelf space ... where such purchase reduces the availability
of other shelf space" (59 Federal Register 21710; see also
60 Federal Register 20409).
In relation to slotting allowance practices, the BATF
sought to identify such practices within the context of pro-
visions that relate to the unfair trade practice known as "tied
house" (27 USC 205[b]). (See Table 2.) This particular pro-
vision of the FAA Act prohibits inducements for retailers to
purchase products from one supplier at the exclusion of oth-
ers and extends from concerns of excessive influence and
control on the part of suppliers during the days of Prohibi-
tion. Slotting practices were to fall within the tied house pro-
visions in the capacity of a "wholesaler exerting control
over a retailer through controlling the resetting of the prod-
ucts on a retailer's premise" (59 Federal Register 2[69S-0l,
21699). Under the original Act, the BATF interpreted slot-
ting fees as "things of value" given to retailers or as "paying
or crediting the retailer for any advertising, display or distri-
bution service" and investigated them as potential violations
of the tied house provisions (cf. 60 Federal Register 20407).
Under the BATF's proposed regulations, the payment of
slotting fees was to be identified more particularly as exclu-
sionary per se.
In addition, slotting allowance practices were to be iden-
tified as falling within the unfair trade practice provisions in
the Act that pertain to "consignment sales" and the prohibi-
tion of "other than bona fide sales" (27 USC 205[d|). Such
prohibited sales are defined to include "sales in connection
with which the industry member bears the cost of display by
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purchasing or renting a trade buyer's shelf space to be occu-
pied by such products" (59 Federal Register 21698-01,
21700). Under the amended regulations, slotting allowance
practices were specified as a form of consignment sale and,
therefore, prohibited by the FAA Act.
Final Regulations
In the spring of 1995, the Treasury Department amended the
trade practice regulations under the FAA Act to prohibit
slotting allowance practices in the retail sale of alcohol bev-
erages as both a violation of the tied house provision and a
consignment sale (60 Federal Register 20402-20428). After
deliberations and considerable public input,"* the BATF
found that "slotting fees put retailer independence at risk"
(60 Federal Register 20409) and therefore provide the basis
for exclusionary outcomes. In addition, the BATF deter-
mined that the practical effect of these fees was a refund of
the purchase price of a product that had not been sold, there-
fore making it an "other than bona fide sale" or consignment
sale (60 Federal Register 20408-20409).
In explaining the rationale for its action, the BATF
expressed concern regarding several possible negative out-
comes of allowing slotting allowances, including the poten-
tial that
•More heavily slotted products could be overrepresented or
"pushed" at the retail level, to the exclusion of other less sup-
ported products.^
• Suppliers who are unwilling or unable to pay slotting
allowances could be excluded from retail distribution because
of the restricted number of lawful distribution alternatives
available in the industry.
• Discrimination in the payment and receipt of slotting
allowances could occur, especially toward small businesses
(e.g., suppliers and retailers) because of their negotiated
nature.6
• Slotting fees, negotiated and paid on a continuing basis, could
jeopardize retailer independence by establishing a quid pro quo
relationship and result in exclusion by creating incentives to
favor particular suppliers (e.g., those paying more).
• Slotting fees could alter the health, competitive environment,
and performance of the alcohol beverage industry.
The BATF's decision included an expanded version of its
original description of slotting fees. Under the adopted reg-
ulations, slotting allowance practices now are defined as
••An importanl aspect of the BATF's decision-making process involved
the solicitation of comments regarding the proposed rules under the Act.
Comments were sought on whether slotting fees should be prohibited or
allowed under the tied house and/or consignment sale regulations. A
reported 1347 letters were received, with 1309 letters (97%) in support of
the BATF"s stated position to prohibit slotting allowance practices (60 Fed-
eral Register 20407).
'The practice of slotting allowances also can be viewed as part of a larger
phenomenon in the retail sector toward greater reliance on "push" market-
ing (i.e.. the practice of providing incentives directly to the retail trade to
create demand for a product) rather than "pull" marketing (i.e.. marketing
directly to end consumers through advertising and other strategies to create
product demand) (Johnson 1988).
*It has been asserted that slotting allowances are highly negotiable, with
the retailer's ability to obtain and the matiufacturer's willingness to pay
such allowances being heavily dependent on the parties' relative market
share and bargaining position. Such circumstances underlie the concerns
for potential discrimination toward both manufacturers and retailers in the
payment and receipt of slotting allowances. See also footnote 2.
"the act by an industry member of purchasing or renting dis-
play, shelf, storage or warehouse space" (60 Federal Regis-
ter 20424). The expanded definition extends the regulations
to include more than just the purchase or renting of specific
shelf space and reflects the conclusion that slotting
allowance practices, as defined originally by the proposed
regulations, were described too narrowly in content.^
Analysis of the BATF Decision
The prohibition of slotting allowance practices by the BATF
in the context of the retail sale of alcohol beverages con-
trasts markedly with their acceptance in other markets. As
we observed, with the exception of a warning against their
discriminatory application {Federal Trade Commission
Guides 1990) and the current investigation of shelf space
practices in the salty-snack food industry by the JD, those
federal agencies primarily responsible for overseeing com-
petitive practices have not found publicly that slotting
allowance practices offend antitrust laws.
Given the BATF's decision and the contrary perspectives
toward slotting allowance practices held by the other federal
agencies, a key question relates to the basis of these policy
differences. In particular, what factors underlie and distin-
guish the prohibition of slotting allowances in the retail sale
of alcohol beverages, relative to other circumstances in
which such practices are allowed? Understanding these dif-
ferences should help reconcile current public policy and
facilitate our understanding of slotting fees. In this section,
the decision of the BATF to prohibit slotting allowance
practices is analyzed, with focus given to how alcohol bev-
erage markets differ in terms of their regulatory environ-
ment, industry structure, marketing practices, and consumer
consumption behavior.
Regulatory Environment
With the possible exception of tobacco and drugs, the regu-
lation of alcohol beverages is unique in its policy goals, his-
torical context, and enforcement approach.
Policy Goals
The regulatory goals accorded to the distribution of alcohol
beverages refiects the policy judgment that infinite market
penetration and availability of alcohol beverages is not a
desired result. As was summarized cogently in a recent fed-
eral appellate court decision, "cheap and plentiful alcohol is
not an unmitigated social good" {Fedway Associates Inc. v.
BATF 1992, p. 1423). Relative to standard economic
'According to information obtained from the comments submitted, slot-
ting allowance practices included a wide range of payments and arrange-
ments, such as
• Setting up new products in a store or warehouse;
• Allocating a specified quantity of shelf or refrigerator space;
• Allocating a favorable shelf or display position;
• Featuring products in advertising during peak demand periods, such as
holidays;
•Setting aside warehouse or back room space for storage; and
• Exclusively carrying a manufacturer's product(s) (60 Federal Register
20408).
These descriptions, some now incorporated in the revised regulations,
characterize a more expansive arrangement than the simple purchase of
shelf space, as was de.scribed by the original proposed regulations.
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notions in unregulated markets that encourage output expan-
sion and the availability of products, a policy goal to regu-
late the distribution of alcohol beverages reflects a dramati-
cally different policy perspective. Further understanding of
the basis of this perspective can be obtained through exam-
ination of the legislative history of the FAA Act.
Historical Context
The FAA Act was enacted in 1935 and designed specifically
to minimize the social and competitive problems of unregu-
lated alcohol beverage distribution in the early days after the
repeal of Prohibition.^ The Act represents congressional
determination to combat what was perceived at the time to
be an "unusually dangerous menace" (National Distributing
Company Inc. v. BATF 1980, p. 1005) and one for which,
because of "many factors not common to other industries,"
the antitrust laws were deemed "insufficient to accomplish
the objective" (National Distributing Company Inc. v. BATF
1980, p. 1008; citing House Report No. 1542, 74th Con-
gress, tst Session 1935, pp. 5-6). In particular. Congress
concluded that there was a close connection between eco-
nomic abuses and "certain incidental social evils" connected
with the distributional practices in the alcohol beverage
industry (National Distributing Company Inc. v. BATF
1980, p. 1008; citing House Report No. 1542, 74th Con-
gress, 1st Session 1935, p. 12). The Act sought to prohibit
practices that resulted in these abuses and subsequent
"social evils." According to the Senate Report (No. 1215,
74th Congress, 1st Session 1953, pp. 6-7) accompanying
the Act,
The first class of these prohibited practices were those which
tended to produce monopolistic control of retail outlets, such as
arrangements for exclusive outlets, creation of tied houses, com-
mercial bribery, and sales on consignment or with the privilege
of return.... [C]ontrol by producers and wholesalers of retail out-
lets through the various devices such as those prohibited by the
bill has been productive not only of monopoly but also of seri-
ous social and political evils which were in large measure
responsible for bringing on prohibition (cited in National Dis-
tributing Company Inc. v. BATF 1980, p. 1008).
Producers or wholesalers were said to obtain control over
independent retailers by providing financial and advertising
assistance on the condition or agreement that the retailer
would serve as an exclusive outlet, thereby providing the
supplier with a competitive advantage.
The greater influence and control afforded producers and
wholesalers from these tied house arrangements also was
linked to a variety of social evils. Some considered these
arrangements a source of political corruption.^ Other mem-
8AS was described In a key case (National Distributing Company Inc. v.
BATF 1980. p. 1005). this was a time when "the nation was infested with
bootleggers and racketeers anxious to continue their trade and willing to
thwart the tax and health laws."
'According to Joseph Choate. then Chairman of the FAA:
The larger distillers and hrewers controlled scores, hundreds, and possi-
bly thousands of such outlets. That inevitably threw them into politics,
inevitably led them to seek control of state and municipal legislation, and
brought about an unhealthy political condition (National Distributing
Company Inc. v. BATF 1980, p. 1009; citing Federal Alcohol Control
Act, Hearing on H.R. 8539 before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 74th Congress, 1st session 1935, p. 10).
bers of Congress suggested that the infiuence and control
wielded by suppliers was a cause for the proliferation of
saloons and bars because of their financial assistance
(National Distributing Company Inc. v. BATF 1980, p.
1009). Many believed such tied house arrangements
increased the consumption of alcohol.'o Another expressed
belief was that these arrangements would result in irrespon-
sible ownership in retail outlets." As a result of these con-
certis, current federal law regarding the distribution and
retail sale of alcohol beverages circumscribes a strict regu-
latory environment that is based on the underlying policy
goal of regulating the output and controlling the availability
of alcohol beverages.
Enforcement Approach
A particular dimension of this regulatory environment is the
ent'orcement approach accorded market channel member
relationships. Concern for the implications of undue infiu-
ence and control by upstream suppliers and wholesalers has
resulted in regulations and an enforcement approach that
place great emphasis on retailer independence in the sale of
alcohol beverages. As we detailed, practices such as slotting
fees, which threaten this independence, are disfavored.
This treatment contrasts markedly with the current per-
spective of contemporary marketing channel theory, which
suggests highly efficient channel systems involve interde-
pendent channel members working closely together with
one another (Stem, El-Ansary, and Coughlan 1996). This
latter perspective underlies and informs the antitrust policy
ascribed to by the JD and FTC.'2 The recognition that effi-
ciency is not the only basis for policy toward alcohol bever-
ages and that other factors, including the perceived social
and political concerns extending from closer economic rela-
tions in the channel system, are also significant is critically
important for understanding the contrary perspectives
toward slotting allowance practices that are held by the
BATF and these federal agencies.
Another dimension of the unique enforcement approach
that emerges from the BATF's interest in retailer indepen-
dence relates to the focus of enforcement efforts. Of partic-
ular interest to the BATF is the impact a specific practice
'"As reflected on by then-Congressman Lewis of Colorado:
One of the evils of the liquor traffic was that a retailer was required by
the brewer or distiller to take a certain quota of beer or spirits of some
private brand as a condition to being allowed to retail that brand. The
temptation was often irresistible for the retailer to induce customers to
buy drinks when they had already had quite enough (National Distribut-
ing Company Inc. v. BATF 1980, p. 1009; citing 79 Congressional
Record 11797).
"As stated by then-Senator Connally:
Is not it true in the old days a lot of the opposition to liquor and beer
arose because of the fact that the brewers would put in sort of a sorry fel-
low who had no responsibility and no money to buy his equipment, and
they would pay for his license and put him in his business, and he was
usually the fellow who violated all the Sunday laws and every other kind
of law? This is why the thing grew up. This evidently is based on that
theory, that a man ought to have some personal responsibility to run a
grog shop, not depending on the brewer financing him (National Dis-
tributing Company Inc. v. BATF 1980, p. 1009; citing 79 Congressional
Record 11797).
'2Both these federal agencies and the majority ofthe courts now consider
the sole goal of antitrust legislation to be efficiency and assess vertical
channel practices on the basis of this goal (Sullivan 1977).
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has on an individual retailer versus the impact a practice
might have on the entire retail market in a particular locale
(60 Federal Register 20403-20404), Such an approach fur-
ther contrasts with those approaches employed by the other
antitrust agencies, which typically focus on the implications
of a practice for the overall market.
Industry Structure
The distinctive structure of the alcohol beverage industry
provides an additional basis for understanding the contrary
treatment of slotting allowance practices by the BATF, Retail
industry trends in the grocery industry are distinguishable
from those for alcohol beverages. Moreover, given the nature
of alcohol beverages and the variety of concerns underlying
the FAA Act and other legislation, considerable restrictions
attend the industry's distribution structure.
Overall Structure
A key factor often cited as contributing to the proliferation
of slotting allowances in the grocery products industry is the
occurrence of increased consolidation at the retail level
(Shaffer 1991), Estimates indicate that supermarkets in gen-
eral account for 73,4% of all grocery sales, with large super-
market chains accounting for more than 50% of this total
(Aalberts and Judd 1991),I3 This concentration, primarily
the result of mergers, has provided retailers and particularly
large chains with greater influence and control over suppli-
ers in the payment of slotting fees.
Although these statistics also are applicable to some
degree for the retail sale of alcohol beverages because many
are sold through large retail chains, a mainstay of the alco-
hol beverage industry has been sales through retailers in the
form of specialty liquor stores and on-premise bars, restau-
rants, and so forth,''• These retailers do not enjoy the influ-
ence and control the larger chains do in dealing with suppli-
ers. Larger suppliers continue to dominate the industry and
maintain considerable influence and control over these and
other retailers. For example, for malt beverages, the top
three brewers control in excess of 75% of the overall mar-
ket. An important distinction, therefore, relates to the over-
all structure in the industry and the balance of influence and
control held by its members. Although less influence and
control undermines the ability of smaller retailers to require
slotting fees, the presence of more powerful suppliers raises
concerns for the independence of retailers by suppliers who
pay these fees and the prospect that, if employed discrimi-
'^As one reviewer pointed out, these national statistics actually may
underestimate the concentration levels for smaller regional markets in
which large supermarket chains hold dominant positions,
'••Industry statistics report, for example, that in 1994, off-premise sales
accounted for 53,9% of beer sales and 59,3% of wine sales (Adams/Job-
son's Wine Handbook 1996a). In this same year, grocery retail sales (i.e.,
grocery stores and supermarkets, but not specialty liquor stores, delis, drug-
stores, ma,ss merchandisers, and club stores) accounted for approximately
72,0% of off-premise beer sales and 33.0% of off-premise wine sales.
Taken as a percentage of total sales, however, including off- and on-
premise sales, grocery sales accounted for just 38,8% of retail beer sales
and only 19.6% of retail wine sales (Adams/Jobson's Wine Handbook
1996b). Overall, beer sales accounted for 53.7% of total alcohol sales, and
wine accounted for 12,5% and spirits 33,9% of these total sales
(Adams/Jobson's Wine Handbook 1996b).
natorily, smaller suppliers might be foreclosed from access
to such retailers.
Distribution Structure
Because of regulatory restrictions for the alcohol beverage
industry at both the federal and state levels, licensed retail
outlets provide the only practical and, in most cases, the
exclusive means through which producers can sell their
products to the public. Often, alcohol beverages may be sold
only through a three-tier distribution structure that includes
a limited number of licensed retail outlets (see generally the
FAA Act and state laws relating to alcohol beverages). Sev-
eral states even manage the distribution and sales of alcohol
beverages themselves through "state stores,"
The limited distribution structure found in the retail sale
of alcohol beverages reflects the overall policy goal of reg-
ulating the widespread availability and dispersion of alcohol
beverages. This derived structure presents unique chal-
lenges to manufacturers for introducing and marketing their
products, especially smaller manufacturers that do not have
the power to demand their way onto shelves. This circum-
stance, though not substantively unique to the alcohol bev-
erage industry, presents a greater challenge, in degree, than
is found in less regulated markets, A primary concem is that
competition involving slotting fees in these channels could
limit further the already restricted number of channels avail-
able to suppliers. The lack of widespread, alternate channels
for introducing products would be particularly challenging
for smaller firms, because of the constraints they face in
paying such fees.
Marketing Practices
Another dimension on which slotting allowance practices in
the retail sale of alcohol beverages can be distinguished
from other retail circumstances relates to the marketing
practices found in the alcohol beverage industry. In the fol-
lowing sections, we examine distinctive aspects of how (1)
new alcohol beverage products are introduced, (2) margins
are employed by retailers, and (3) other more general mar-
keting practices are used.
New Products
The practice of slotting allowances in the retail grocery
industry has been associated most often with the increasing
proliferation of new products and the costs and risks these
products impose on retailers (Hammonds and Radtke
1990), 15 In addition, many grocery product categories are in
the mature stage of their product life cycle. At this stage,
line or brand extensions are a logical strategy (Johnson
1988), resulting in fewer "true" new products being intro-
duced (Friedman 1990; Sales and Marketing Management
1989), Moreover, though data are not available, some indus-
try observers contend that many of the new products intro-
duced are presented with little market research, testing, or
long-term promotional or advertising support, which results
in high failure rates (Sales and Marketing Management
l5New product introductions in the retail grocery indu.stry have grown
from approximately 2000 in 1975 to 4000 in 1981 to more than 10,000 in
1988 {Sales and Marketing Management 1989) to 12,000 in 1990 (Fried-
man 1990; Shapiro 1990).
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1989). A review of new product failure rates indicates that
these rates are at high levels—estimated as high as 80%
(Shapiro 1990) to 90% (Donahue 1989).
The nature of new products and the process and support
provided for their introduction in the alcohol beverage
industry contrasts with that found in the grocery retail busi-
ness and provides some basis for distinguishing slotting
allowance practices in this context. In particular, though
increasing, fewer new alcohol beverage products typically
are introduced each year than are products in many other
categories of the grocery industry, and they have lower fail-
ure rates. (Tenser [1992] recognizes only 87 major malt bev-
erage introductions from 1982 to 1992, with 78 still on the
market in 1992.) In part, this is due to the longer develop-
ment times required for new alcohol beverages (Bronfman
1993).
The research and testing conducted for new alcohol bever-
age introductions also differs from that for many grocery
products. New products often are introduced initially through
"on-premise consumption" retailers (e.g., restaurants, bars)
prior to their widespread introduction in grocery retail estab-
lishments. This process differs from grocery products, which
most often are introduced directly to the retail store, and
reduces considerably the risk of new product failure at the
grocery retail level—a key rationale for slotting allowance
practices in the grocery products industry.
The marketing support provided to new alcohol beverage
products also differs in many respects from that given to
more typical retail grocery goods. Where lawful, alcohol
beverage manufacturers perform many of the retail tasks
employed to justify grocery slotting allowances, including
stocking, rotating, maintenance, removal of products, in-
store promotion, and so forth. Many of the costs associated
with new products and their introduction therefore are borne
by the manufacturer rather than by the retailer. In summary,
the risks and costs associated with introducing new alcohol
beverage products do not seem to be as high for retailers,
which therefore provides some challenge to this as a basis
for justifying slotting fees.
Retailing
In the grocery industry, retailers argue that low margins
(average 1.5%) on many products undercut their ability to
absorb the costs and risks of new product introductions prof-
itably, which therefore requires these costs and risks to be
passed back to manufacturers in the form of slotting fees
(Donahue 1987). In contrast, retailers of alcohol beverages
receive much greater margins. Margins average approxi-
mately 24% for alcohol beverage retailers, which makes it
harder to justify the need for slotting fees to offset the costs
and risks associated with new products (Charlier 1994).
Other Factors
Grocery retailers also justify their use of slotting allowance
practices by observing that they now have better access to
sales and profitability information, which enables them to
assess new product performance better {Sales and Market-
ing Management 1989). Advances in information technol-
ogy, including checkout scanning, direct product profit
information programs, and computer-assisted shelf space
planning, provide grocery retailers with greater and more
accurate performance information that enables them to
assess and assign slotting costs more precisely (Dagnoli and
Freeman 1988; Stem 1993). Retailers also contend that slot-
ting fees compensate them for giving up shelf space that
could be used by higher-margin private-label products. Pri-
vate-label brands have become a dominant force in the gro-
cery products industry, accounting for a growing share of
products on retailer's shelves. However, many smaller
retailers of alcohol beverages have not adopted information
technology to the extent of large grocery retailers, nor have
private labels obtained high levels of penetration in the
industry (Shapiro 1994). Hence, retailers of alcohol bever-
ages have a weaker set of arguments for justifying slotting
allowance practices than grocery retailers do.
Consumer Consumption Behavior
Another important difference associated with the retail sale
of alcohol beverages relates to the nature of consumer con-
sumption behavior. Although alcohol beverages most often
are sold through standard-format retail stores, a particularly
high percentage of retail alcohol sales involve on-premise
consumption in restaurants, bars, and so forth. On-premise
consumption involves an estimated 45% of all alcohol bev-
erage retail sales (Bellamy 1994; Rogers and Keene-Osbom
1994). This form of consumption behavior differs from that
found for the majority of retail grocery products and further
distinguishes slotting allowance practices in the retail sale of
alcohol beverages.'^
An often-cited complaint against slotting allowance prac-
tices is the relation of slotting fees to the actual costs of new
products. Slotting fees are argued to bear little relation to
new product costs, and wide discrepancies in fees are
reported across retailers (Gibson 1988). It is commonly
believed that these inaccuracies reflect, among other things,
errors associated with identifying and tracking new product
costs and the assignment of such costs in the form of slot-
ting fees (notwithstanding the increasing use of information
technology). The widespread consumer practice of on-
premise consumption in the sale of alcohol beverages results
in added difficulties for measuring new product costs not
typically found for grocery products. Moreover, many bars,
restaurants, and such do not possess the sophistication
required to identify and track these costs accurately and
assess slotting fees precisely. Therefore, the potential effi-
ciencies that justify slotting fees in the grocery industry
appear less likely to be realized in the retail sale of alcohol
beverages.
Implications
Our comparative analysis of the regulatory environment,
industry structure, marketing practices, and consumer con-
sumption behavior in the retail sale of alcohol beverages
versus other retail goods, particularly grocery products,
reveals a variety of key differences. These differences pro-
vide insight into the BATF's contrary policy treatment of
slotting allowance practices in the retail sale of alcohol bev-
erages. Understanding these differences helps reconcile cur-
'*It is important to point out that the BATF rule against slotting
allowances in the retail sale of alcohol beverages also would appear to
apply to slotting practices that involve on-premise consumption outlets.
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rent public policy, further enhances our knowledge of slot-
ting fees, and provides directions for additional research.
Reconciling Public Policy
In terms of public policy, our analysis reveals that unique
political concerns and regulatory goals underlie the distrib-
ution and retail sale of alcohol beverages and provide con-
trary implications for the BATF's assessment of slotting
allowance practices. In particular, political concerns about
undesirable social outcomes, which have resulted in policy
goals that attempt to control the widespread availability of
alcohol beverages and discourage high levels of alcohol
beverage consumption, are distinguishable from those found
for other goods. In terms of slotting fees, these concerns and
goals have translated into an objective of maintaining
retailer independence and lead to the prohibition of prac-
tices, such as slotting fees, that are believed to jeopardize
retailer independence and result in exclusionary outcomes.
The analysis also reveals that these concerns and regula-
tory goals have resulted in considerable federal and state
restrictions for the overall industry and its distribution struc-
ture. Examination of the alcohol beverage industry shows
that differences exist in the locus of influence and control in
the industry compared with other retail sectors and that the
available channels through which products can be intro-
duced are more limited and regulated than for other prod-
ucts. Permitting slotting allowances in this context poten-
tially could constrain further the available options for distri-
bution, with the possibility of differentially disadvantaging
small producers.
In addition, we identify as distinctive a variety of market-
ing practices with respect to alcohol products, including the
nature of new products and their introduction, margins for
alcohol versus other grocery products, and other factors.
These practices further establish the unique nature of alco-
hol beverage marketing practices and distinguish them, rel-
ative to the practices that provide a basis and justification
for slotting allowances in other contexts.
Finally, we identify the general nature of consumer con-
sumption behavior toward alcohol beverage products as dis-
tinctive from that found for many grocery products, with a
greater extent of consumption occurring on-premise. This
distinction creates complications for the implementation of
slotting allowance practices in the alcohol beverage industry.
Together, the variety of factors and distinctions identified
for the retail sale of alcohol beverages provides some expla-
nation and an argued basis for the BATF's differential treat-
ment of slotting allowance practices. Understanding the
basis of different public policy treatment toward a particular
practice enables businesses to be more confident in their
decision making, especially with regard to practices for
which public policy is still developing or contrary agency
perspectives are held.
Understanding Slotting Fees
In terms of our understanding of slotting fees, this analysis
further enhances our knowledge of the occurrence, nature,
practice, and effect of slotting allowance practices. In par-
ticular, it highlights the increasing occurrence of slotting
fees in nongrocery products categories. Prior commentary
has tended to focus mainly on this industry. The analysis
provided here focuses on such practices outside the grocery
products industry, in the context of alcohol beverages.
Beyond grocery food products and alcohol beverages, slot-
ting fees also have been reported by observers in the soft-
ware (Radding 1989), music (Trachtenberg 1995), and phar-
maceutical (Kiley 1989) industries and among booksellers
(Tabor 1996). Further analysis of these contexts is required
to understand fully the nature of this marketing practice.
In addition, the analysis reveals the expanding nature of
slotting allowance practices. Of particular note in the extant
case is that these fees appear to apply to existing, as well as
new, products. As now defined by the BATF, slotting
allowances include "the act by an industry member of pur-
chasing or renting display, shelf, storage or warehouse
space" (60 Federal Register 20424). This definition is not
limited to new products but appears inclusive of existing
products. An important implication of this perspective is
that prior explanations of the efficiency-enhancing benefits
of slotting allowance practices have emphasized their appli-
cation with respect to new products. Expansion of such
practices to include other than new products requires that
these explanations be amended to include applications to
existing products.
In relation, though the definition adopted by the BATF
appears to include products, new or otherwise, it does
emphasize "realty," with its identification of "display,"
"shelf," "storage," and "warehouse" space. This contrasts
somewhat with the definitions of slotting allowances that
emphasize all forms of retailer patronage and include such
fees as are paid for making new product presentations, sur-
veys, and failure (i.e., product removal) fees. At this time, it
is not clear whether the BATF definition encompasses such
practices. Although close examination of the regulations
suggests that such practices might be included, in that this
definition is provided as merely descriptive of such prac-
tices, just how nonrealty-based slotting allowance practices
will be interpreted will have to wait application of the regu-
lations by the BATF. Widespread comments initially
prompted the BATF to expand its previous, even narrower
proposed definition, which referred to "purchasing or rent-
ing specific shelf space," to include other realty space.
Our analysis also reveals additional information regard-
ing the practice of slotting allowances. Although not char-
acterized in the proposed regulations to be considered under
the commercial bribery (see Table 2) part of the regulations,
many commentators describe slotting fees as bribery or
"payola" that is paid directly to an individual rather than the
business entity itself. In addition, at least one commentator
described such fees as providing the basis for exclusive out-
lets and called for the prohibition of such arrangements. In
each case, these comments provide a glimpse of the prac-
ticed operationalizations of slotting allowance arrange-
ments, as reported by industry participants. The nature of
such practices suggest that these operationalizations might
not be restricted exclusively to the alcohol beverage context.
In this respect, each comment provides fertile territory for
close public policy examination in other industries.
This analysis also provides information regarding the
potential effects of slotting fees. These include effects
beyond their characterization as jeopardizing retailer inde-
pendence in the alcohol beverage industry and, as such.
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have potential implications for the evaluation of such prac-
tices in other contexts. In particular, small businesses, both
manufacturers and retailers, were identified as being partic-
ularly disadvantaged by slotting allowance practices. Sev-
eral commentators voiced their disapproval of the theory
that these fees enable small manufacturers to introduce new
products by "buying" their way into the market. Commenta-
tors suggested that such theory is unrealistic in application
because usually small or start-up businesses do not have the
funding to compete with larger companies for retailer space.
In addition, it was observed that because these fees encom-
pass, in some cases, bids for shelf space, they do not reflect
the true costs they are supposed to capture. For small retail-
ers, the disadvantages identified include the observation that
individual stores and smaller chains have considerably less
or no leverage in obtaining slotting fees. As a consequence,
these smaller firms could be discriminated against in the
receipt of these fees and receive a disproportionately lower
allocation in the industry. These commentaries are revealing
of the competitive implications of slotting allowances and
should be useful for future public policy development.
Additional Research
Finally, with regard to scholarship, academic research of
slotting allowance practices could take several directions. In
terms of increasing our general understanding of slotting
fees, further research is needed regarding the overall occur-
rence, nature, practice, and effects of these fees in other con-
texts. Although considerable attention has been given to this
practice in the grocery context and in this study of alcohol
beverages, as we mentioned, the practice of slotting
allowances appears to be evolving in other product cate-
gories (e,g,, Pharmaceuticals, books, music products).
Investigation of the nature of such strategies, as applied in
each of these areas, is needed. Furthermore, research could
be undertaken on how slotting fees have expanded to
include both new and existing products. Research that cap-
tures more fully the context and practice of slotting is
needed to understand this phenomenon fully.
In terms of public policy research, though our current
research focuses on federal initiatives toward slotting fees
and, in particular, treatment of these practices by the BATF,
additional research might involve examining state-based
policy. Activity at the state level has been reported on the
part of the states' attorneys general offices and other agen-
cies. For example, based on an increasing number of com-
plaints, the Califomia Attorney General's office initiated an
investigation into slotting practices (Davey 1990; Kiley
1990a), Initiatives on the part of state officials represents, in
part, their reaction to the lack of policy initiatives at the fed-
eral level and the number of received complaints. Examina-
tion of extant policy and current developments at the state
level toward slotting practices is needed.
In addition to reviews of current public policy at the fed-
eral and state levels toward slotting allowances, further
research also might involve examining more closely those
arguments and rationales that underlie the different public
policy positions that have developed. In particular, scholarly
research that focuses on the theoretical logic attendant to
these positions and their underlying assumptions could help
reinforce current policy or future adaptations to these poli-
cies. To date, the primary basis on which public policy has
developed has been economic theorizing. Conceptual exam-
ination and empirical testing of the relationships that consti-
tute these theories is needed to reconcile differing perspec-
tives and increase the general understanding of these prac-
tices. In this respect, research that addresses the argued risk
allocation and signaling basis of slotting fees provides one
avenue for inquiry. Particular questions include the follow-
ing: Do slotting fees play an efficient role in allocating the
risk and costs of new products to those best positioned to
control and absorb them? Do slotting fees actually serve as
a credible signal with regard to the success or failure of a
product? Do slotting fees serve to encourage manufacturers
to research and support their products better?
In addition to these questions, investigation of the anti-
competitive explanations of slotting allowances is required.
These practices have been argued to be the result of
exploited market power and have been objected to on the
basis that they serve mainly as a mechanism for foreclosing
less resourceful competition. Important research questions,
in this respect, include those that focus on the transition of
power in the marketing channel to the retail institutions and
those that examine the competitive strategies of rival firms
and their effects in the marketplace. For example, what
structural and nonstructural factors have contributed to the
increasing power of retail institutions? How do organiza-
tions view slotting allowance strategies in practice? What
effects have slotting fees had on new product introductions,
product line extensions, promotion dynamics, research and
development, innovation, small firms in general, and large
firms?
Finally, research on the effect slotting allowance prac-
tices have on consumers is required and includes a plethora
of questions ranging from their impact on consumer prices
and choice to the diffusion of innovation among consumers.
Together, these and other research questions provide fertile
territory for additional academic research.
Conclusion
The practice of slotting allowances, or fees, paid to retailers
to obtain their patronage continues to receive attention from
industry participants, public policymakers, and commenta-
tors. Considerable controversy and debate surrounds this
competitive practice and its implications for participants and
consumers. With this article, we attempt to contribute to this
dialogue by examining current policy perspectives and
recent rulemaking by the BATF that relate to slotting
allowance practices in the alcohol beverage industry.
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